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Private and Utility Enhanced Recommendations
with Local Differential Privacy and Gaussian
Mixture Model
Jeyamohan Neera, Xiaomin Chen, Nauman Aslam, Kezhi Wang and Zhan Shu
Abstract—Recommendation systems rely heavily on behavioural and preferential data (e.g. ratings and likes) of a user to produce
accurate recommendations. However, such unethical data aggregation and analytical practices of Service Providers (SP) causes
privacy concerns among users. Local differential privacy (LDP) based perturbation mechanisms address this concern by adding noise
to users’ data at the user-side before sending it to the SP. The SP then uses the perturbed data to perform recommendations. Although
LDP protects the privacy of users from SP, it causes a substantial decline in recommendation accuracy. We propose an LDP-based
Matrix Factorization (MF) with a Gaussian Mixture Model (MoG) to address this problem. The LDP perturbation mechanism, i.e.,
Bounded Laplace (BLP), regulates the effect of noise by confining the perturbed ratings to a predetermined domain. We derive a
sufficient condition of the scale parameter for BLP to satisfy ε-LDP. We use the MoG model at the SP to estimate the noise added
locally to the ratings and the MF algorithm to predict missing ratings. Our LDP based recommendation system improves the predictive
accuracy without violating LDP principles. We demonstrate that our method offers a substantial increase in recommendation accuracy
under a strong privacy guarantee through empirical evaluations on three real-world datasets, i.e., Movielens, Libimseti and Jester.
Index Terms—Data Privacy, Gaussian Mixture Model, Local Differential Privacy, Recommendation Systems
F
1 INTRODUCTION
THE proliferation of smartphones is boosting the usageof online shopping platforms. With more and more
retailers moving online, users feel overwhelmed with too
many options and have trouble finding a product or service
to fulfil their expectations. Most online shopping platforms
use recommendation systems so that users can find items
that could interest them.
Collaborative Filtering (CF) is a recommendation model
widely used to predict users’ preference for unpurchased
items. Although CF offers higher recommendation accuracy,
it causes privacy risks as service providers (SPs) gather a
large amount of user data to predict purchasing behaviour
patterns of users. Narayanan et al. [1] demonstrated how
analyzing users’ historical ratings can disclose sensitive in-
formation such as users’ political preference, health-related
information and sometimes even their sexual orientation.
Hence, it is pivotal for SPs to protect the privacy of users
while providing suitable personalized recommendations.
Differential Privacy (DP) is a popular tool that can guar-
antee strong privacy protection even when the adversary
owns a considerable amount of auxiliary information about
the user [30]. Most of the existing works on DP based pri-
vacy protection methods focused on protecting the privacy
of users against a third-party adversary and assume that
the risk of the SP causing privacy violation is minimal.
Unfortunately, many SPs are apt to gather more data from
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users than they need and continue to procure sensitive
information about users’ behaviour for their own added
benefits. Cambridge Analytica investigations [27] reveal the
dangerous consequences of such harmful and unethical
data aggregation practices. Not only could untrustworthy
SPs violate users’ privacy, but even trustworthy SPs might
encounter an accidental privacy leakage as they own an
enormous amount of sensitive user information. Narayanan
et al. [1] deanonymize the Netflix rating data to show how
trusted SPs could cause accidental data leakage.
Local Differential Privacy (LDP) [32] has attracted much
attention as it can provide a strong privacy guarantee in a
setting where SPs are untrustworthy. Many researchers [4],
[5], [6] have adopted LDP to protect the privacy of users
in recommendation systems. Each user adds noise to their
data locally in LDP-based privacy protection models and
forwards the perturbed data to the SP. As the original data
never leaves the user device, users are guaranteed plausi-
ble deniability. Adopting LDP in recommendation systems
cause low data utility for SPs. The recommendation accu-
racy is comparatively higher in DP-based recommendation
systems as they perturb a query output, whereas LDP-based
recommendation systems add noise to the individual data
point. Therefore, it is crucial to design LDP based recom-
mendation system that provides strong privacy protections
to users and simultaneously offers higher data utility to the
SP.
Motivated by this, we propose an LDP-based recom-
mendation system that perturbs original ratings of a user
within a predefined domain using the Bounded Laplace
(BLP) mechanism. We then use a Mixture of Gaussian (MoG)
model to estimate the aggregate noise at the SP to enhance
the data utility. The main contributions of this work are
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listed below:
• We introduce BLP as the input rating perturbation
mechanism to increase the recommendation accuracy
of the LDP-based recommendation systems. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to introduce
BLP as the input data perturbation mechanism and
to provide a sufficient condition for BLP to sat-
isfy ε-local differential privacy in recommendation
systems. We empirically evaluate the role the BLP
mechanism plays in enhancing predictive accuracy
in Section 5.3.2.
• The probability density function of Bounded Laplace
noise is conditional on the input rating matrix, unlike
the Laplace mechanism, where there are no bound-
ing constraints to restrict the noise samples. Hence
we perform a theoretical analysis to identify and
yield a noise distribution for the Bounded Laplace
mechanism. We derive a closed-form probability
density function for noise drawn from BLP for a
given dataset.
• We introduce a noise estimation component at SP
to further increase the predictive accuracy of the
recommendation system. Perturbation of each user’s
rating leads to higher predictive error, which in-
creases linearly with the number of users and items.
We adopt Matrix Factorization (MF) with a Mixture
of Gaussian (MoG) to estimate the aggregated noise
at SP and at the same time to predict missing rat-
ings. This novel approach tackles data utility issues
found in LDP based recommendation systems. We
empirically evaluate the effect of MF with MoG in
terms of achieving higher recommendation accuracy
in Section 5.3.3. We also show that the proposed
LDP based recommendation model outperforms the
existing LDP based recommendation models such as
[4] and [6] in Section 5.3.4.
• Our approach causes much lower communication
cost compared to existing LDP based recommenda-
tion systems e.g. [4]. Users only need to transmit
each perturbed rating once to the SP in our proposed
method. On the contrary, in other systems such as
[4], the information exchange between a user and the
SP continues for several iterations until the solution
converges.
Our method protects users’ privacy from untrustworthy
service providers. However, there are some cautions and
limitations that we need to indicate. Firstly, we assume that
each user sends a single rating to the service provider at
any given time, and this rating is independent of other
users’ ratings. We presume all the ratings are sensitive and
essential in building a behavioural profile for a user. Hence
we perturb all the ratings of the users that cause heavy
utility loss. We provide a solution to address this issue -
combining a noise estimation model (MoG) with the recom-
mendation algorithm to sanitise the obfuscated data at the
service provider. Secondly, we only mask the rating scores
of users to items, but not the set of items a user has rated.
The exposure of user-item association can harm user privacy
to some extent. However, hiding the relationship between
users and items will further reduce data utility. The recently
proposed methods such as federated learning-based models
[39] [40] require a significant change to the system architec-
ture. On the contrary, we can apply our proposed privacy-
enhanced recommendation system to an existing centralised
recommendation model with satisfactory recommendation
accuracy and low communication and computation costs.
We will seek solutions to strengthen privacy protections
further against the exposure of user-item linkage in future
work.





R Original rating matrix
R∗ Perturbed rating matrix
N BLP noise matrix
rij or r Original rating
r∗ij or r
∗ Perturbed rating
nij or n BLP noise
l Minimum value in rating scale
u Maximum value in rating scale
U User Latent Factor Matrix
V Item Latent Factor Matrix
ui Latent factors of user i in latent matrix U
vj Latent factors of item j in latent matrix V
2 RELATED WORK
Generally, recommendation systems use privacy protection
models based on techniques such as obfuscation [28] and
perturbation [29]. These approaches introduce random noise
to data. Yet, the magnitude of noise added using these
methods cannot be calibrated easily. DP is another popular
perturbation approach used in privacy protection models.
DP based methods are proven to be a stronger solution
for privacy protection in various applications compared to
other perturbation methods. DP provides an information-
theoretic guarantee of strong privacy protection regardless
of how much knowledge the adversary possesses. Unlike
other perturbation approaches, in DP, the calibration of
noise depends on the sensitivity of the query and the level
of privacy offered to the user.
Many DP based recommendation systems assume a
trusted SP who collects users’ ratings and releases infor-
mation related to users’ preferences under a differential
privacy guarantee. McSherry and Mironov [2] are the first
ones to integrate the DP based privacy protection model
with collaborative filtering-based recommendation systems.
In their method, SP is considered trustworthy. They build
a covariance matrix using the user’s original ratings that
resemble the similarity between users. They then apply the
Laplace mechanism to perturb the covariance matrix before
predicting missing ratings. In their method, the trusted SP
still has access to sensitive unperturbed data of a user. Yakut
and Polat [34] also introduce a DP based recommendation
system where user’s original ratings are stored at SP using
a perturbation approach which provides uncertainty over
user’s actual ratings. This method also ensures that some
user profiles contain fake ratings depending on the privacy
budget set by the SP. Even though DP based recommen-
dation models offer privacy protection to users from third
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party adversaries, they enable SP to collect the original
ratings from users, which in return causes privacy concerns.
Hence, the attention of researchers is gradually shifting
from DP to LDP. Many applications have adopted LDP to
deal with untrustworthy SPs. Erlingsson et al. [7] propose
the first local differentially private perturbation mechanism,
RAPPOR, for crowd-sourcing data aggregation. Google uses
this mechanism [7] to collect users’ Chrome usage statis-
tics privately. RAPPOR uses a randomized response (RR)
mechanism to perturb each bit of the data independently
before sending it to Google for further analysis. However,
high communication overhead during the data collection
phase is a drawback found in this method. Bassily et al.
[35] propose another perturbation mechanism to address the
issue found in RAPPOR. Each user report one randomly
chosen bit rather than reporting d number of bits back
to the SP using the succinct histogram (SH) mechanism.
However, the SH perturbation mechanism is more suitable
to the simple numeric or categorical attributes, and it is not
appropriate for more complex data mining tasks.
Qin et al. [36] also propose an algorithm for perform-
ing heavy hitters estimation under the guarantee of LDP.
In another work, Wang et al. [37] propose another LDP
algorithm for data aggregation and decoding. These two
methods can generate perturbed data and reconstruct the
statistical characteristics. However, they cannot recreate the
cross-correlation relationship between data. To address this
problem, Zhang et al. [38] propose an LDP algorithm that
can reconstruct cross-correlation relationships among high-
dimensional data. In their method, marginal tables are
generated and then perturbed. They send only the noisy
marginal tables to the SP. However, this method is not
suitable for collaborative filtering based recommendation
systems as these systems require users to send their his-
torical data.
Several works have investigated using LDP in CF-based
recommendation systems. In their work, Liu et al. [31]
propose a privacy-preserving recommendation system that
uses a randomized perturbation mechanism. First, noise is
added to users’ ratings locally on the user-side through a
randomized perturbation method. Additionally, they also
add noise to the correlation computation method at SP. Even
though this method can guarantee more privacy protection,
it incurs more predictive accuracy loss. Meng et al. [9]
address this problem by concentrating on ratings that are
considered sensitive. They divide a user’s historical ratings
into sensitive and non-sensitive ratings. They use a large
magnitude of noise to perturb sensitive ratings. Hence,
sensitive ratings receive better privacy protection, while the
recommendation system can achieve improved predictive
accuracy. However, the distinction between sensitive and
non-sensitive data can vary from user to user and cannot be
generalized to all users.
Shen and Jin [33] propose an instance-based relaxed ad-
missible mechanism to perturb users’ private data. They aim
to hide users’ preference towards an item from an untrusted
data aggregator. However, this method can still reveal users’
preferences towards an item category. Hua et al. [5] propose
another LDP based recommendation model where the SP
uses LDP based MF method to compute item profile latent
factors. Subsequently, SP sends these item profiles latent
factors to the users for computation of user latent factors.
Each user then sends the updated item latent factors back
to the SP. This method requires the users to remain online
during the whole MF process. Their proposed model adds
additional communication and processing cost on the user
side.
Shin et al. [4] also propose an LDP-based recommenda-
tion model where they use a randomized response mech-
anism to perturb data on the user side. In their method,
instead of sending the item latent factors back to the SP,
each user sends back the perturbed gradient of their user
latent factor. This method incurs additional processing and
communication overhead to the user-side as same as [5]. In
another work, Berlioz et al. [6] have investigated the effect
of rating perturbation in different stages of the recommen-
dation process. They evaluate the role input and output
perturbation mechanisms play on predictive accuracy.
To summarize, existing LDP based recommendation sys-
tems suffer from low predictive accuracy and communica-
tion/computational overhead. Current works do not per-
form any analysis on the perturbed data to eliminate the
noise caused by randomization. Additionally, some of the
proposed methods focus on frequency estimation, such as
heavy hitter identification. Hence these methods are not
suitable for collaborative filtering as they focus only on a
specific candidate set and cannot identify the correlation
between users/items. Therefore, we propose an LDP based
recommendation system, which perturbs users’ ratings on
the user-side and estimates the noises added on the SP side
to ensure high predictive accuracy.
3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Differential Privacy
DP-based privacy protection models are relevant in settings
where the SP is trusted and aggregates users’ original data.
Assume two adjacent data sets D and D′ where D′ differs
from D by one record.
Definition 1. A randomized mechanism M satisfies ε-
differential privacy if for any adjacent datasetsD andD′, and any
subset S of all possible outputs, we have the following inequality:
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] 6 eε × Pr[M(D′) ∈ S],
where ε is the privacy budget.
DP limits an adversary from inferring whether an input
data set D or D′ produced the given output S and the
privacy budget ε controls the privacy loss. The smaller the
value of the privacy budget ε, the lower the confidence the
adversary has in distinguishing whether dataset D or D′
produced the output. Hence, DP provides a higher degree
of privacy protection for lower values of privacy budget ε.
Definition 2. Given a query f : D −→ R, the sensitivity of f ,




The sensitivity of a function indicates how much noise
is required to perturb a query result. It parametrizes the
maximum difference a single record can make on the output
of a query.
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3.1.1 Post Processing
Dwork et al. [30] proved that a differentially private result is
immune to any privacy attacks even after post-processing.
This property is key to our work, as SP can carry out any
computation on aggregates of differentially private output
without violating the principles of DP. The following defini-
tion clearly defines this property.
Definition 3. Let M be a randomized algorithm that is ε-
differentially private. Let g be an arbitrary function. Then, g ◦M
is also ε-differentially private.”
3.2 Local Differential Privacy
Definition 4. A randomized mechanism M satisfies ε-LDP if
for all possible pairs of user input x, x′ and any subset y of all
possible outcomes, we have the following inequality:
Pr[M(x) ∈ y] 6 eε × Pr[M(x′) ∈ y].
In the LDP setting, the data of each user is perturbed
locally before being sent to the SP. So the SP aggregates
the perturbed data instead of the original data. Therefore,
SP cannot infer any information about the actual data by
observing the perturbed output even though they possess
substantial background knowledge about the user. In this
regard, LDP offers plausible deniability to users. Intuitively,
LDP ensures that the SP cannot infer whether a user’s input
x or x′ produce the output y with confidence.
3.3 Laplace mechanism
The Laplace mechanism adds random noise drawn from
Laplace distribution to ensure ε-differential privacy. We
use the notation Lap(0, blap) to indicate that the Laplace
mechanism uses a Laplace distribution with mean 0 and
scale parameter (i.e. variance) blap to sample noise.
Definition 5. Given a query f : D −→ R, the randomized
mechanism M satisfies ε-differential privacy if:
M(D) = f(D) + Lap(0, blap).
The scale parameter blap controls the width of Laplace
distribution. If ∆f is the sensitivity of the query f and ε is
the privacy budget, then the scale parameter blap of Laplace





Hence, the width of the Laplace distribution is dependent
on sensitivity ∆f and privacy budget ε.
3.4 Matrix Factorization
Matrix Factorization algorithm is the state-of-the-art tech-
nology used in CF-based recommendation systems. Many
E-commerce platforms prefer MF over other methods due
to its higher predictive accuracy and computational scala-
bility. The rating matrix R that contains ratings of m users
over n items acts as input for the MF algorithm. Each
element rij in the rating matrix indicates the rating of user
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m} on item j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. MF algorithm
predicts the missing rating by modelling the interactions
between users and items as the inner product of latent factor
spaces. MF algorithm factorizes the given rating matrix
R into two latent matrices: U (user latent factor matrix)
and V (item latent factor matrix). MF obtains the user and
item latent matrices by minimizing the squared error for all





[rij − uTi vj ]2. (1)
In Eq. (1), ui represents the relationship between user i
and the latent factors in the user latent matrix U . Similarly,
vj represents the relationship between item j and the la-
tent factors in the item latent matrix V . The non-convex
optimization problem given by Eq. (1) is solved using ei-
ther stochastic gradient descent (SGD) or alternating least
squares (ALS) method. After obtaining the latent matrices,
MF predicts the missing rating of a user on an item using





4 LOCAL DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY RECOMMENDA-
TION WITH BLP AND MOG
Our proposed recommendation model is applicable in a
setting where the users are cautious about sharing sensitive
information with an untrustworthy SP. Fig. 1 illustrates
the proposed recommendation system. An LDP mechanism,
BLP, perturbs the actual ratings of a user before sending to
the SP. Hence, the SP can only aggregate perturbed ratings
from the users. At the SP, MF with MoG model estimates the
noise added to the ratings and perform missing rating pre-
diction. The post-processing property of LDP implies that
further processing a perturbed output of a ε-differentially
private mechanisms does not cause any adverse effects on
privacy protection [30]. Since LDP mechanisms are immune
to post-processing, estimating noise at the SP-side does not
cause any additional privacy risk to users. We will describe












Top K Recommended Items
Rating Perturbation
Fig. 1. LDP based MF recommendation with MoG
4.1 LDP Rating Perturbation
4.1.1 Bounded Laplace Mechanism
As discussed in section 3, the Laplace mechanism achieves
ε-differential privacy by sampling random noise within
the range of −∞ to ∞. The perturbed output thus falls
within the domain of −∞ to ∞. For example, the Laplace
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. , NO. , 5
mechanism might produce a negative result as a perturbed
output while perturbing a user rating. Although this nega-
tive output holds no physical meaning in terms of the rating
scale, it is still a valid output of the Laplace mechanism.
Such inconsistent perturbed ratings have an immense effect
on the predictive accuracy of MF based recommendation
systems.
We use BLP as an input perturbation mechanism to
increase the predictive accuracy of LDP based recommenda-
tion systems. The BLP mechanism ignores off-limit values
and samples noise for a given input rating continuously
until a perturbed rating falls within the predefined output
domain. Given an input rating r, the BLP mechanism con-
tinuously samples noise from a Laplace distribution until
the perturbed rating r∗ falls within the predefined output
domain, i.e. l ≤ r∗ ≤ u, where l is the minimum and, u is
the maximum value of the given rating scale.
Bounded Laplace mechanism can be defined using the
probability density function (pdf) as below [26]:
Definition 6. Given a domain interval of (l, u), input r ∈ [l, u]
and the scale parameter b > 0, the Bounded Laplace mechanism










b , if r∗ ∈ [l, u],








b dr∗ is a normalization factor
dependent on input r.
Lemma 1. The normalization factor C(r) is given by:






























































Assume that r and r′ are a pair of possible inputs to a
randomized mechanism and r′ = r + z. We define F (r, z)
as:
















Proof. The full proof is given in Appendix A.





Theorem 1. When scale parameter b ≥ ∆fε−log∆C , it is sufficient
to show that the Bounded Laplace mechanism W satisfies ε-local
differential privacy
Proof. Assume that r and r′ are a pair of possible inputs to
a Bounded Laplace mechanism and r′ = r + z. Let 0 ≤ z ≤
∆f . r∗ represents a perturbed output produced by the BLP
mechanism. Given the domain of the perturbed output is
[l, u], we can note that,
Pr(W (r) ∈ [l, u]) = 1
C(r)
Pr(M(r) ∈ [l, u]),
where M represents the Laplace mechanism.
We aim to find a condition under which W satisfies ε-
local differential privacy. Based on the LDP definition, we
can note that,
Pr(W (r) ∈ [l, u]) ≤ eεPr(W (r′) ∈ [l, u]),
1
C(r)
Pr(M(r) ∈ [l, u]) ≤ eε 1
C(r′)
Pr(M(r′) ∈ [l, u]).
































∗ can be ob-
tained using the triangle inequality, i.e.






















































































We find a lower bound for C(r)C(r′)e
ε− |r
′−r|
b and proceed to
find a condition for Eq. (3) to hold.
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Theorem 1 provides the scale parameter for BLP to sat-
isfy ε-local differential privacy. It also demonstrates that BLP
cannot satisfy ε-local differential privacy when inheriting
the scale parameter from the Laplace mechanism. In our
recommendation system, we use BLP as an input rating
perturbation mechanism. Input perturbation mechanism
calibrates the magnitude of noise added to original ratings
according to the sensitivity given by ∆f = u− l.









1− 12 (1 + e
−u−lb )
.
When ∆f = u− l,
∆C =
1− 12 (1 + e
− (u−l)b )
1− 12 (1 + e
− (u−l)b )
= 1.
Thus log ∆C = 0.
Therefore we can conclude that a sufficient condition
needed for BLP mechanism to satisfy ε-local differential
privacy in our recommendation system can be given by:
b ≥ u− l
ε
.
Algorithm 1 details the stages involved in generating a
perturbed rating using BLP mechanism.
Algorithm 1 BLP Mechanism for Noise Sampling
1: Input to the Mechanism: Original Rating (r)
2: Output of the Mechanism: Perturbed Rating (r∗)
3: A noise value is generated from the Laplace distribution
with mean 0 and variance of b - Lap(0, b)
4: Add noise to original rating to obtain perturbed rating:
r∗ = r + Lap(0, b)
5: If (r∗ ∈ (l, u)):
6: Perturbed rating is set to r∗
7: else
8: repeat Step 3 until (r∗ ∈ (l, u))
9: Return Perturbed rating to SP
4.1.2 BLP Noise Distribution
The noise distribution of BLP mechanism can be theoret-
ically derived for any given dataset of true input ratings.
Consider a discrete rating system containing h evenly dis-
tributed discrete ranks with step size c. The rank set is
denoted by Q = {Q1, .., Qh−1, Qh}, and | Qi+1 − Qi |=
c, 1 ≤ i ≤ h − 1. Let r be a true rating, its corresponding
perturbed rating is r∗ = r+ n, where n is the random noise
drawn by BLP mechanism. Since r∗ can only take values in
the set Q, i.e. Q1 ≤ r∗ ≤ Qh, we have the noise range for




Q1 − r ≤ n < Qh − r
)
,
θr represents the probability that the noise variable n falls
into the interval (Q1 − r,Qh − r) given an input rating r.







Q1 −Qi ≤ n < Qh −Qi|r = Qi
)
where Pr(r = Qi) is the probability that the input rating
equals to Qi, and Pr
(
Q1 − Qi ≤ n < Qh − Qi|r = Qi
)
is the conditional probability that the BLP noise lies within
the interval (Q1 −Qi ≤ n < Qh −Qi) under the condition
that the input rating is Qi. Note that not all the input
ratings inQ leads to the noise n falling within this particular
range. When the perturbed rating r∗ /∈ Q, the conditional
probability Pr
(
Q1 −Qi ≤ n < Qh −Qi|r = Qi
)
yields 0.
The noise added by the BLP mechanism over all possible
input ratings inQ is a random variable ranging within (Q1−
Qh ≤ n < Qh − Q1). We will then divide the range into
equal intervals. The length of each interval is the rank step
size of c. The probability that the noise variable lies within
each interval is given as:
Pr
(





Pr(r = Qi) ·
Pr
(
Q1 −Qh−t ≤ n < Q1 −Qh−t−1|r = Qi
)










Pr(r = Qi) ·
Pr
(
Qh −Qt+1 ≤ n < Qh −Qt|r = Qi
)
∀t = 2, · · · , h− 1.
(5)
The conditional probability is given by
Pr
(








































for t = 2, · · · , h− 1.
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4.2 Noise Estimation with Mixture of Gaussians
The MoG model is widely used to approximate probability
distributions with no closed-form expression. In image pro-
cessing this model is being used for the purpose of image
segmentation [16], image compression [14] and background
subtraction [15]. We propose an MoG with MF recommen-
dation model to estimate the noise added to the true ratings
and predict missing ratings. Since a multivariate Gaussian
distribution can model the uncertainty of a noise data point,
MoG is a good solution for noise estimation.
Since we add BLP noise to each true rating in the true
rating matrix R, the perturbed rating matrix R∗ can thus be
given by:
R∗ = R+N.
We aim to find a mixture of K Gaussian components which
best represents the noise distribution. We assume that each
noise data point nij in N is drawn from a Gaussian distri-
bution N (nij | 0, σ2k) where σk is the standard deviation of
the k-th Gaussian component. The mixture of K Gaussian
components representing the noise data point nij can thus
be given by:
p(nij | Π,Σ) ∼
K∑
k=1
πkN (nij | 0, σ2k),
in which πk (
∑K
k=1 πk = 1) is the mixture proportion repre-
senting the probability that nij is drawn from the k-th mix-
ture component. Π = (π1, π2, ....πk) and Σ = (σ1, σ2, ....σk).
As given in preliminaries, each known rating in original




Hence each rating r∗ij in the perturbed rating matrix can be
given by:
r∗ij = rij + nij = (u
T
i )vj + nij .
Subsequently, the probability distribution of perturbed rat-
ing r∗ij can then be given by:
p(r∗ij | ui, vj ,Π,Σ) =
K∑
k=1
πkN (r∗ij | (uTi )vj , σ2k).
The likelihood of R∗ can thus be given by:





πkN (r∗ij | (uTi )vj , σ2k),
where Ω represents the set of non-missing data points in
perturbed rating matrix R∗. Given the likelihood, next,
we derive the maximum likelihood estimates of the model

































4.3 Expectation Maximization for MoG
We use Expectation-Maximization (EM) method [17] to
evaluate and compute model parameters V,U,Σ and Π to
maximize the likelihood function given by Eq. (6). The EM
is an iterative algorithm that can be summarized as follow:
• Initialize the model parameters
• Evaluate the initial value of log-likelihood
• Expectation (E-Step) : Evaluate the posterior respon-
sibilities using the current model parameters
• Maximization (M-Step) : Re-estimate the model pa-
rameters using the current posterior responsibilities
EM algorithm updates the parameters and alternates E-step
and M-step until convergence. The standard EM algorithm
estimates the mean of each cluster at every iteration. In our
system, the clusters share the same parameters U and V .
At first, we randomly initialize the model parameters
V,U,Σ and Π to estimate posterior responsibilities of K
Gaussian components. In E-step, we estimate the posterior
responsibility for each noise point nij using the current
model parameters V,U,Σ and Π as:
γijk =
πkN (r∗ij | (uTi )vj , σ2k)∑K
k=1 πkN (r∗ij | (uTi )vj , σ2k)
. (8)
The posterior responsibility reflects the probability that k-th
Gaussian component produces the noise point nij . Then in
M-step, we re-estimate each model parameter V,U,Σ and Π
based on the posterior responsibilities γijk from E-step. We




















(x)(r∗ij − (uTi )vj)2, (9)
where S is the total number of non-missing data points,
S
(x+1)
k is the sum of γijk for k-th Gaussian component and
x is the total number of iterations EM algorithm runs until
convergence. Then we update the model parameters U and
V . We can rewrite the portion in Eq. (7) which is related to



























ij − uTi vj)2, (10)







, if i, j ∈ Ω
0, if i, j /∈ Ω.
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W  (X − UV T )2.
The weighted low-rank MF problems can be solved
using methods such as Weighted Low-Rank Approximation
[20], Damped Newton [19] and Weighted PCA [18]. We use
Weighted PCA in this work to re-estimate model parameters
U and V . The EM algorithm stops alternating between E-
step and M-step when two consecutive user latent factor
matrices U cause a change smaller than the given threshold
value or the number of iterations reaches the pre-defined
threshold. Algorithm 2 details the process of how MoG with
the MF model estimates noise and predict missing ratings.
Algorithm 2 Noise Estimation and Rating Prediction Model
1: Input: Perturbed Ratings (R∗)
2: Output: U and V
3: Initialization: Model parameters U, V,Π and Σ are ran-
domly initialized
4: In E-step posterior responsibility γijk(x) is estimated
using Eq. (8)
5: For Until convergence
6: (M-Step for updating Σ(x+1) and Π(x+1)) Model
parameters Σ and Π are computed using Eq. (9)
7: (M-Step for estimating V and U ) Model parameters U
and V are updated using Eq. (10)
8: (E-step for posterior responsibility γijk) posterior re-
sponsibility γijk is computed using current model pa-
rameters
9: Return User and Item latent factor matrices U and V
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed
recommendation model through real-world datasets.
5.1 Datasets
We use three datasets: Movielens [21], Libimseti [23] and
Jester [22] in the evaluation. Table 2 provides a detailed
view of the datasets. For privacy budget ε, we consider the
value range from 0.1 to 3, lower values of privacy budget ε











Movielens 100k 1682 943 0.5 to 5
Jester 2 Million 100 73,421 -10 to 10
Libimseti 17,359,346 168,791 135,359 1 to 10
5.2 Evaluation Metrics
5.2.1 RMSE
We use the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) to evaluate
the predictive accuracy. We calculate the RMSE values over
10-fold cross-validation. RMSE can be estimated as :
RMSE =
√∑n−1
i=0 (ri − r̂i)2
n
,
where ri is the actual rating, r̂i is the predicted rating and n
is the total number of ratings in the aggregated dataset.
5.2.2 F-Score
We use F-score to evaluate the utility of our recommen-
dation system. Table 3 provides a detailed visualisation
of how good a recommendation model is at predicting
recommendations. Positives represent recommended items






Recommendations Positives True Positive False Positive
Negatives False Negative True Negative
Precision and recall can be computed as follow:
precision =
#true positives




#true positives + #false negatives
.
We calculate F-score over top-10 recommended items. F-
score can be computed as :




5.3.1 Noise Distribution Evaluation
We derive the BLP noise distribution theoretically in section
4.1.2. In this section, we show that the noise distribution
of Laplace and BLP mechanisms are distinct. We gener-
ate 100,000 random noise samples using BLP and Laplace
mechanisms for the Movielens dataset while positioning
their privacy budget ε to 0.1 and 1. Fig. 2a and 2b dis-
play the probability of noise samples drawn by Laplace
and Bounded Laplace mechanisms. From the probability
density functions, we note that the noise distribution of
the two mechanisms is distinct. We also plot the BLP noise
distribution curve based on our derived noise distribution
expressions given by Eq. (4) and (5). Fig. 2a and 2b show
that the theoretical derivation of distribution follows the
experimental distributions exactly.
5.3.2 Influence of BLP on predictive accuracy
In this experiment, we demonstrate that using BLP as an
input perturbation mechanism does play a significant role in
obtaining higher predictive accuracy. We measure the RMSE
when either BLP or Laplace act as the input perturbation
mechanism while using the same rating prediction model
(MoG or SVD). Fig. 3a and 3b display the resulting RMSE
metric values for Movielens and Jester datasets respectively.
The BLP mechanism results in higher recommendation ac-
curacy than the Laplace mechanism for both rating predic-
tion models.
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(a) ε = 1
(b) ε = 0.1
Fig. 2. Laplace vs Bounded Laplace Noise Distribution
5.3.3 Influence of MoG on predictive accuracy
In this experiment, we demonstrate that employing MoG
in our recommendation model aids to improve predictive
accuracy for lower values of privacy budget ε. We measure
the RMSE values when using the MF with MoG or the SVD
for rating prediction while using the same data perturbation
mechanism. Fig. 4a and 4b display the resulting RMSE val-
ues for Movielens and Jester datasets respectively. For both
datasets, the predictive accuracy from the MoG prediction
model is much higher than SVD.
5.3.4 Predictive accuracy comparison over other private
recommendation models
We compare the predictive accuracy of our recommendation
model with other existing local differentially private recom-
mendation models such as:
• Input Perturbation Method (ISGD) [6]: This method
perturbs the user’s original ratings locally using the
Laplace mechanism. However, they apply a trunca-
tion method to ensure that the perturbed rating falls
within a pre-defined domain. The noised ratings that
fall out of a pre-defined range are clamped to either
lower or upper bound of the rating domain using
a threshold value. ISGD method uses MF for rating
prediction at the SP side.
• Private Gradient-Matrix Factorization (PG-MF) [4]:
This approach uses MF to perform recommenda-
tions. In this approach, the user computes user latent
factors locally without submitting them to the SP. The
SP estimates the item latent factors after collecting
gradients from the users. Users, on the other hand,
compute a perturbed gradient and submit that to
the SP. The SP aggregates the perturbed gradient
from all the users and then update the item latent
factors accordingly. This method requires iterative
communication between users and SP.
We use Non-Private MF as the baseline method as it does
not use any local perturbation mechanism to perturb the
user’s original ratings. Instead, the MF algorithm uses actual
ratings to predict missing ratings. The baseline method
provides us with a lower bound RMSE value for predictive
TABLE 4
Comparison of Communication Cost for Movielens
Recommendation
Model
User to SP SP to User
BLP-MoG-MF 1 bit No transfer
ISGD 1 bit No transfer
PG-MF 1 bit 0.15MB
error. Our recommendation model (BLP-MoG-MF) uses BLP
as input perturbation mechanism and MoG-MF as recom-
mendation algorithm. The BLP-MoG-MF method uses the
objective function specified by Eq. (1) to obtain latent factor
matrices. ISGD and PG-MF methods also use the same
objective function to perform rating predictions. To maintain
the fairness of comparison, we did not compare our results
with recommendation models that use different approaches
to predict missing ratings.
Firstly, we compare BLP-MoG-MF with PG-MF. We vary
the privacy budget ε from 0.1 to 1.6 for the Movielens
dataset. Fig. 5 displays the RMSE values for BLP-MoG-MF,
PG-MF and the baseline method. As expected, when the
privacy budget increases, predictive accuracy for all privacy
protection methods increases. Because when privacy budget
ε increases, the magnitude of privacy loss LDP mechanism
permits increases, which causes a rise in the predictive
accuracy. More importantly, we notice that BLP-MoG-MF
provides a lower RMSE than PG-MF for the same privacy
budget ε.
Then, we compare BLP-MoG-MF with the ISGD method
for Movielens, Libimseti and Jester datasets. We vary the
privacy budget ε from 0.1 to 3 for all the datasets in this
simulation. Fig. 7a, 7b and 7c display the RMSE values for
BLP-MoG-MF, ISGD and the baseline methods. The results
show that BLP-MoG-MF outperforms ISGD significantly for
all values of the privacy budget ε. This trend implies that
our method guarantees higher data utility for all the values
of privacy budget ε.
5.3.5 Analysis of Communications Cost
We compare the communication cost incurred in our ap-
proach to recommendation models proposed by [4] and [6].
Table 4 summarises the analysis. Both BLP-MoG-MF and
ISGD methods require the user to transfer a perturbed rating
whenever the user rates an item. In the PG-MF method,
the user transmits the perturbed gradient of user-latent
factors to SP over multiple data transmission iterations. Both
BLP-MoG-MF and ISGD methods do not require the SP to
transmit any data back to the user. However, in the PG-MF
approach at each iteration, the SP transmits an updated item
latent factor matrix back to the user. This exchange between
the SP and the user continues until the number of iterations
reaches a pre-defined threshold value. We assume a single
rating is 1 bit. The estimated size of the transmitted data for
each iteration for the PG-MF method is approximately 0.15
MB for the Movielens dataset [1]. The comparison shows
that we significantly reduce the communication cost in our
proposed model compared to other local differential private
recommendation models.
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(a) Movielens (b) Jester
Fig. 3. Bounded Laplace Mechanism vs Laplace Mechanism RMSE Comparison
(a) Movielens (b) Jester
Fig. 4. MoG vs SVD Prediction Model RMSE Comparison












Fig. 5. PG-MF vs BLP-MoG-MF RMSE Comparison for Movielens
5.3.6 Privacy Analysis
We use F-score as a utility metric to evaluate the recommen-
dation accuracy and the privacy budget ε to measure the
privacy loss of our system. We compute the F-score by com-
paring the top 10 items that our LDP based recommendation
system recommends against the top 10 items recommended
by other algorithms. Fig.6 demonstrates the F-score values
for BLP-MoG-MF and PG-MF methods. Similar to RMSE
values, the F-score value increases as the privacy budget
ε increases. This increase indicates that the items recom-
mended by the BLP-MoG-MF are becoming more similar
to items recommended by the non-private recommendation
system when the privacy loss is getting higher. The F-score
results also show that BLP-MoG-MF provides more accurate
recommendations compared to PG-MF for all values of pri-
vacy budget ε. Likewise, Fig. 8(a), 8(b) and 8(c) illustrate the
F-score values for Movielens, Jester and LibimSeti datasets













Fig. 6. PG-MF vs BLP-MoG-MF F-Score Comparison for Movielens
for BLP-MoG-MF and ISGD methods. There is a substantial
increase in F-score as the privacy budget ε increases for
all three datasets and both methods. Again, for all three
datasets, the F-score of the BLP-MoG-MF is higher than the
ISGD.
6 CONCLUSION
In our work, we have proposed a recommendation model
under the consideration of an untrustworthy service
provider. We have used BLP as a local input perturbation
mechanism and MoG-MF for noise estimation and rating
prediction. Compared to existing solutions, our proposed
recommendation model can improve predictive accuracy
and guarantees strong user privacy. Besides, our method
does not incur any further communication cost to the user
side as it only requires the user to transmit the perturbed
rating to the SP.










Fig. 7. BLP-MoG-MF vs ISGD RMSE Comparison
(a) Movielens (b) Jester (c) LibimSeti
Fig. 8. BLP-MoG-MF vs ISGD RMSE Comparison
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Assume r and r′ are a pair of possible inputs of the BLP
mechanism where r′ ≥ r and r′ = r + z. Let 0 ≤ z ≤
∆f . In order to prove Lemma 2, we must first consider few
other properties concerning C(r). First we find ∂∂zF (r, z) ≥
0 when r + z ≤ u.
∂
∂z
























































As b > 0, we then see that ∂∂zF (r, z) ≥ 0 when r + z ≤ u.









































































Since r ∈ [l, u], it proves that eu−rb , e r−lb > 1. When z ≥ 0,
it shows that e−
z
b < 1 and e
z
b > 1. Therefore, ∂∂rF (r, z) ≤ 0
when z ≥ 0.
As ∂∂rF (r, z) ≤ 0, the maximum value of F (r, z) at a












Then, as ∂∂zF (l, z) ≥ 0, the maximum value of F (l, z) is
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[7] Ú. Erlingsson, V. Pihur, and A. Korolova, “Rappor,” Proceedings
of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Commu-
nications Security - CCS 14, 2014.
[8] Apple’s ‘Differential Privacy’ Is About Collecting Your Data—But
Not Your Data (2016). [Online]. Available: https://www.wired.
com/2016/06/apples-differential-privacy-collecting-data/
(Accessed 24th Jan 2020).
[9] X. Meng, “Personalized privacy-preserving social recommenda-
tion,” in Proc. AAAI Conf. Artif. Intell., 2018.
[10] S. P. Kasiviswanathan, H. K. Lee, K. Nissim, S. Raskhodnikova,
and A. Smith, “What Can We Learn Privately?,” 2008 49th Annual
IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2008.
[11] F. Liu, “Generalized Gaussian Mechanism for Differential Pri-
vacy,” IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering,
vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 747–756, Jan. 2019.
[12] R. Gemulla, E. Nijkamp, P. J. Haas, and Y. Sismanis, “Large-scale
matrix factorization with distributed stochastic gradient descent,”
Proceedings of the 17th ACM SIGKDD international conference
on Knowledge discovery and data mining - KDD 11, 2011.
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